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This  paper  looks  at  the  asset  correlation  bias  resulting  from  ﬁrms’
assets  and  liabilities  being  denominated  in  different  currencies.  It
focuses  on  the  time-variation  in  the  bias  and  on  the  dependency  of
the  bias  on  currency  movements.  Overall,  we  ﬁnd  that  the asset
correlation  bias  for  the  average  pair  of  ﬁrms  in the  Dow  Jones
Industrial  Average  index  is  signiﬁcant.  The  bias  ﬂuctuates  widely,
however,  and  it  has  turned  negative  for  shorter  periods.  The  policy
implication  of  the  paper  is  that  by ignoring  the  exchange  rate  com-
ponent  when  computing  portfolio  credit  risk  one  may  materially
underestimate  the  actual  risk.
©  2014  The  Author.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open
access  article  under  the  CC BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
For the average bank, the risk category that is the most important to manage accurately is credit
risk. In order to monitor this risk the typical bank puts much effort into assessing the likelihood that
its counterparties will not honor their future contractual obligations. For corporate counterparties
(ﬁrms) this risk is often estimated using quantitative models, such as the Merton (1974) model. In
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Fig. 1. The volatility of the two USD exchange rates USD/EUR and USD/GBP from 1973 to 2013.
these models the main focus is on the ﬁrm’s assets and on the likelihood that the market value of
these assets falls below the value of the ﬁrm’s debt at some point in the future. Since banks rarely, or
never, lend to one single ﬁrm but to a large number of ﬁrms, the banks spend much time and money on
estimating how the credit risk of one borrower affects the credit risk of other borrowers. This “portfolio
perspective” to credit risk modeling requires quantitative estimates of credit risk dependencies and
the most commonly used proxy for this dependency is the, so-called, asset correlation.
The asset correlation is simply the correlation between two borrowing ﬁrms’ asset values and the
higher this correlation is the larger the credit risk is when lending to both ﬁrms simultaneously. One
complication that arises when focusing on correlations between asset values is that asset values are
not observable. While the value of a ﬁrm’s equity is instantaneously available to everyone through
the stock market, the asset value is not. Instead, asset values have to be estimated using models, for
instance the above-mentioned Merton (1974) model.
In this paper we focus on another important issue when assessing ﬁrms’ credit risk; namely the
risk that currency movements affect the value of the ﬁrms’ assets. This risk appears when ﬁrms have
some, or all, of its assets denominated in another currency than its debt. Not only does this currency
mismatch affect the likelihood that the ﬁrm will default, due to the additional layer of exchange rate
risk put on top of the original credit risk, but it also affects the default dependency, i.e. the asset
correlation, amongst ﬁrms. If the ﬁrms have signiﬁcant portions of their assets denominated in a
foreign currency, these ﬁrms’ asset correlation will typically be biased upwards. As will be shown
below, the bias increases not only with the amount of assets held abroad but also with the volatility of
the exchange rate as well as with the correlation between the assets and the exchange rate. Now, the
volatility of many of the major exchange rates has increased over time and two examples are shown
in Fig. 1. This, plus the widespread “risk-on, risk-off” mentality among investors as of lately, with an
associated hike in most ﬁnancial correlations, is likely to have increased the economic signiﬁcance of
the bias.
The ﬁrst study to acknowledge the issue of currency risk in credit risk modeling is Tasche (2007).
While Tasche (2007) derives an analytical relationship that has to hold between asset correlations
with and without currency risk he presents no empirical results and does not estimate the actual real-
life size of the currency-risk-induced asset correlation bias. To assess the economic importance of the
bias, Byström (2013) builds on the theoretical ﬁndings in Tasche (2007) and empirically estimates the
asset correlation bias for a sample of US ﬁrms in different industrial sectors. Byström (2013) ﬁnds the
bias to be positive and large enough to potentially result in a signiﬁcant underestimation of actual
portfolio credit risk.
In this article we focus on the exchange rate and on how the time-series behavior of the exchange
rate affects the asset correlation bias. Particular emphasis is put on the time-variation of the bias, and
the ﬂuctuations of the empirically estimated asset correlation bias are compared to the theoretically
predicted relationship between the bias and the exchange rate movements. The main ﬁnding is that
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the asset correlation bias varies signiﬁcantly over time and that the bias, contrary to the ﬁndings in
Byström (2013), sometimes is negative for the average ﬁrm-pair in the Dow Jones Industrial Average
index (DJIA). At least some of this bias time-variation is caused by changes in the volatility of the
exchange rate as well as by changes in the correlation of the exchange rate with the ﬁrms’ asset
values; i.e. by changes in the currency dynamics. The empirically observed bias variation is shown to be
consistent with the analytically expected sensitivity of the bias to changes in exchange rate-volatility
and -correlations.
The policy implication of the paper is clear and simple; ignoring the exchange rate component
when computing portfolio credit risk can lead to a signiﬁcant underestimation of the actual risk. At
a time of a heightened risk of signiﬁcant exchange rate movements, perhaps caused by a euro-area
breakup or widespread competitive devaluations, this is more important than ever.
In Section 2 we brieﬂy discuss how exchange rate risk affects the estimation of asset correlations.
Section 3 discusses the setup of the study as well as the data, and Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The asset correlation bias
Tasche (2007) shows that if borrowing ﬁrms hold assets and liabilities in different currencies then
the asset correlation estimates among these ﬁrms are biased. The additional exchange rate dynamics
and its interaction with the asset value dynamics is the cause of this bias and Tasche (2007) demon-
strates how to calculate the bias under the assumption that both asset value- and exchange rate
movements follow geometric Brownian motions. If ri is the correlation between these two  processes,
i.e. the correlation between the exchange rate changes and the asset value changes of borrower i, if i
is the volatility of the asset value changes of borrower i and if  is the volatility of the exchange rate
changes, then the relationship between * and , i.e. the asset correlation with and without a currency
mismatch between assets and liabilities, is
∗ = a + b (1)
where the intercept, a, and the slope, b, are, respectively,
a = (r1/1) + (r2/2) + (
2/(12))√
(2/21 ) + 1 + ((2r1)/1)
√
(2/22 ) + 1 + ((2r2)/2)
and
b = 1√
(2/21 ) + 1 + ((2r1)/1)
√
(2/22 ) + 1 + ((2r2)/2)
.
Here, we use the alternative presentation of the relationship suggested by Byström (2013) rather
than the original presentation in Tasche (2007) to emphasize the linear nature of the link between *
and .
3. Data and empirical setup
In order to compute the asset correlation bias, both volatility- and correlation-estimates (i and ri)
involving the non-observable asset value process are required. Tasche (2007) never actually empir-
ically estimates the bias and Byström (2013) uses a credit derivatives based method suggested in
Byström (2011) to back out the required time series of asset values. An attractive feature of the Byström
(2011) method is that it relies on two separate markets, i.e. the stock market and the credit derivatives
market (both being mature and efﬁcient) to get the market value of the ﬁrm’s entire capital structure.
The method is also fairly free of assumptions and simpliﬁcations. Here, however, we have instead cho-
sen to use the well-known Merton approach where the asset values are backed out from stock prices
and balance sheet data using the Black–Scholes option pricing framework (Merton, 1974). The reason
for this choice is threefold. First, this choice will reveal whether the signiﬁcant bias found in Byström
(2013) is merely a result of the way asset correlations are calculated. Second, the Merton approach is
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applicable also to ﬁrms without traded credit default swaps, i.e. a much larger range of ﬁrms can be
covered, and, third, the Merton approach is the most widely used method of estimating time-varying
asset values and it is therefore a natural choice in this study where the focus is on the time-variation
of the asset correlation bias.
The Merton model recognizes that a ﬁrm’s equity is equivalent to a long position in a call option
on the ﬁrm’s assets with strike price equal to the ﬁrm’s debt level. As a result, the equity value is
expressed as
VE = VAN(d1) − e−rf (T−t)DN(d2) (2)
where VE, the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity; VA, the market value of the ﬁrm’s assets; D, the ﬁrm’s
debt level (all the debt is homogeneous); T − t, the time to maturity of all the ﬁrm’s debt; rf, the risk-free
interest rate,
d1 =
ln((VA)/D) + (rf + (1/2)2A)(T − t)
A
√
T − t
d2 = d1 − A
√
T − t
N(), the cumulative normal distribution
Ito¯-calculus gives us a second equation, E = (VA/VE)N(d1)A, and from these two  equations we  can
back out VA, the asset value (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003; Hull et al., 2005). In this study we  rely on daily
stock price data and, consequently, back out daily asset values/returns that are used to calculate daily
(historical) asset volatilities and -correlations. The exchange rate changes, and all the volatilities and
correlations required for the calculation of the bias, are also computed using daily data. The risk-free
interest rate is proxied by the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate and the default-triggering debt level is set
equal to the ﬁrm’s total debt for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and half of the total debt for ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The
rationale behind this choice is that ﬁnancial ﬁrms differ from non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms by being much more
leveraged. However, the government often supports ﬁnancial ﬁrms in times of crisis, and, as mentioned
by (CreditGrades, 2002), this makes ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ “effective leverage ratio lower than that implied by
standard debt-per-share calculations”. CreditGrades (2002) gives no information on how much lower
this “effective leverage ratio” should be and, as a result, we calculate effective debt levels for ﬁnancial
ﬁrms by simply multiplying the actual debt levels by a half. This choice also shares similarities with
the way Moody’s|KMV  chooses the default point in its KMV  model as the sum of the short-term debt
and half the value of the long-term debt (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). Finally, the debt level is updated
on a daily basis through a linear interpolation between the debt levels at the start and the end of the
sample. The stock return volatility is calculated as the 250-day trailing historical standard deviation.
All the data is downloaded from Datastream except the debt levels that are downloaded through the
A. Damodaran website (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/∼adamodar/).
Our study focuses on the 30 ﬁrms in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index (DJIA) and the time-
period is January 3, 2000 to January 29, 2013. The currencies that we  choose for the (hypothetical)
currency exposure of the DJIA-ﬁrms are the euro (EUR), the British pound (GBP), the Japanese yen
(YPY), the Chinese renminbi (CNY), the Argentine peso (ARS) and the US dollar index (USDX). Although
similar to the setup in Byström (2013), the current paper differs from that paper in important ways.
In addition to the current paper’s focus on the exchange rate dynamic’s effect on the asset correlation
bias, the paper differs from Byström (2013) in the following ways; (i) in looking at the time-variation
of the bias, (ii) in the way asset values are estimated (using the Merton (1974) approach instead of
the Byström (2011) approach), (iii) in the much larger number of estimated asset correlations (435
compared to 50), (iv) in the selection of ﬁrms, (v) in the slightly extended time-period and (vi) in the
use of a slightly different set of currencies.
4. Results and analysis
This section is divided into two parts; ﬁrst, we  look at the sensitivity of the currency-risk-induced
asset correlation bias to the behavior of the exchange rate using “semi-analytical” relationships, and,
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Fig. 2. The “semi-analytical” asset correlation bias as a function of the exchange rate volatility of the US dollar index (USDX)
computed using Eq. (1) with input-parameters estimated from the actual empirical sample. All the parameters are listed in
Tables 1 and 2.
second, we study the size and time-variation of the actual bias for the ﬁrms and currencies above from
the start of the millennium up until early 2013.
4.1. The sensitivity of the asset correlation bias to currency movements
In order to compute the asset correlation bias, estimates of the parameters a and b in Eq. (1) are
required, and to estimate these parameters one needs the correlation between each ﬁrm’s asset returns
and the exchange rate changes plus the volatility of each ﬁrm’s asset returns as well as the volatility of
the exchange rate changes. The exchange rate changes are easily calculated from observable exchange
rates but the asset returns have to estimated/computed. As described above, in this paper we  use one
of the most commonly used methods, i.e. the Merton (1974) approach, to estimate asset values, asset
returns and asset volatilities/correlations.
In Figs. 2 and 3 the “semi-analytical” asset correlation bias, which is calculated using Eq. (1), is
plotted as a function of, respectively, the exchange rate volatility and the asset value–exchange rate
correlation (temporarily assuming that both ﬁrms’ assets have the same correlation with the exchange
rate). We  limit ourselves to studying one single currency here, the US dollar index, and all parameters
Fig. 3. The “semi-analytical” asset correlation bias as a function of the asset value–exchange rate correlation for the US dollar
index (USDX) computed using Eq. (1) with input-parameters estimated from the actual empirical sample. All the parameters
are listed in Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 1
Asset value statistics.
Asset volatility (sample volatilities for all 30 ﬁrms) average (cross-sectional) 0.016
max (cross-sectional) 0.024
min (cross-sectional) 0.012
Asset correlation (sample correlations for all 435
ﬁrm-pairs)
average (cross-sectional) 0.40
max (cross-sectional) 0.84
min (cross-sectional) 0.16
are estimated from the actual empirical sample. The parameters can be found in Tables 1 and 2. The
ﬁrst observation is that the bias is an increasing function of both the exchange rate volatility and the
asset value–exchange rate correlation. Furthermore, the bias varies signiﬁcantly and in a non-linear
fashion with changes in the volatility and the correlation of the exchange rate. Also, while the bias
is positive across the entire spectrum of exchange rate volatilities, the bias, somewhat surprisingly,
turns negative for sufﬁciently negative asset value–exchange rate correlations. This “semi-empirical”
analysis indicates that the positive asset correlation bias highlighted by Tasche (2007) and discussed
further in Byström (2013) may  not always be positive. In fact, we  will show empirically that for some
of the currencies in this study the bias, indeed, turns negative for shorter periods.
Table 2
Exchange rate statistics.
Exchange rate volatility US dollar index (USDX) full sample 0.0053
max (250-day window) 0.0086
min (250-day window) 0.0030
USD/EUR full sample 0.0065
max (250-day window) 0.011
min (250-day window) 0.0034
USD/GBP full sample 0.0060
max (250-day window) 0.012
min (250-day window) 0.0038
USD/YEN full sample 0.0064
max (250-day window) 0.010
min (250-day window) 0.0042
USD/ARS full sample 0.012
max (250-day window) 0.041
min (250-day window) 0.0004
USD/CNY full sample 0.0008
max (250-day window) 0.0014
min (250-day window) 0.00001
Asset–exchange rate correlation
(average across the 30 ﬁrms)
US dollar index (USDX) full sample 0.060
max (250-day window) 0.56
min (250-day window) −0.32
USD/EUR full sample 0.048
max (250-day window) 0.45
min (250-day window) −0.26
USD/GBP full sample 0.072
max (250-day window) 0.36
min (250-day window) −0.20
USD/YEN full sample −0.11
max (250-day window) 0.072
min (250-day window) −0.31
USD/ARS full sample 0.008
max (250-day window) 0.12
min (250-day window) −0.09
USD/CNY full sample 0.011
max (250-day window) 0.21
min (250-day window) −0.11
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Using the sample estimates (average, max  and min) in Table 2 as a reference point for empirically
representative intervals of exchange rate volatility and average asset value–exchange rate correla-
tion for various currencies, we can compare our semi-analytical results with empirical evidence. The
relationships shown in Figs. 2 and 3 are based on the US dollar index, and the average volatility and cor-
relation over the time-period 2000–2013 for the US dollar index are, respectively, 0.0053 and 0.060.
As for the time-variation,  the empirical exchange rate volatility varies between a low of 0.0030 (in
late 2006) and a high of 0.0086 (in late 2008) and the average asset value–exchange rate correlation
varies between a low of −0.32 (in late 2002) and a high of 0.56 (in late 2011). With these empirically
estimated ﬁgures, of which particularly the correlation-interval indicates a very large time-series vari-
ation, we can determine which parts of the graphs in Figs. 2 and 3 that are empirically representative
as well as get a ﬁrst rough indication of the actual size (and sign) of the asset correlation bias in the
US market.
When it comes to the exchange rate volatility, Fig. 2 shows that for the empirically observed span
of volatilities in our data sample the asset correlation bias would vary in a range between 0.03 and
0.17 if all other parameters (hypothetically) were kept constant. More interestingly, for the (average)
DJIA-ﬁrm asset value–exchange rate correlations, Fig. 3 demonstrates that for the empirically observed
(and very wide) span of asset-value–exchange rate correlations the bias of the asset correlation would
vary within the range −0.06 to 0.18 if all other parameters were kept constant. That is, the bias would,
at times, turn negative (ceteris paribus).
Finally, from the semi-analytical relationships presented graphically in Figs. 2 and 3 we  can also
estimate the sensitivity of the asset correlation bias to changes in either the exchange rate volatility
or the asset value–exchange rate correlation. The sensitivities are calculated numerically as the per-
centage change in the bias (the forward- and backward differences are equal to the second decimal)
caused by a ±1% change in the volatility and correlation, respectively, starting at the empirically esti-
mated average values in Table 2 (0.0053 and 0.060, respectively). Our calculations show that for every
1% change (from, say, 0.005300 to 0.0005353 or from 0.005300 to 0.0005247) in the exchange rate
volatility (ceteris paribus) the asset correlation bias changes ±1.51%. In other words, volatility = 1.51.
And for every 1% change in the asset value–exchange rate correlation (ceteris paribus) the asset cor-
relation bias changes ±0.23%. That is, correlation = 0.23. From these numbers we  learn that the bias is
(on average, across the time-period) more sensitive to changes in the volatility of the currency than
to changes in the currency’s co-variation with the assets. This does not necessarily mean that the
volatility is the main driver behind the bias, however. Due to the much larger time-variation in the
correlation than in the volatility (the highest asset value–exchange rate correlation in our sample is
800% higher than its sample average while the highest volatility is just 60% above its sample average)
the asset value–exchange rate correlation is, nonetheless, most likely the more important determinant
of the time-variation in the bias.
4.2. The time-variation in the asset correlation bias
In the analysis above, the semi-analytical relationships between the asset correlation bias and,
respectively, the exchange rate volatility and the asset value–exchange rate correlation were studied.
Here, we are instead looking at the actual empirical bias when estimating asset correlations amongst
the 30 DJIA-ﬁrms for six different currency exposures from January 2000 to January 2013. We  esti-
mate all the inputs for the bias-calculation, i.e. the volatilities and correlations, on a daily basis using
overlapping 250-day long lagged windows.
The average bias (across the 435 correlations) is plotted in Fig. 4 for each of the six currencies, and
an immediate observation is that the bias varies signiﬁcantly across the thirteen year sample period.
Moreover, the size of the bias is often signiﬁcant when compared to the average asset correlation for
this sample of ﬁrms which is 0.40. At times, the bias is even comparable in magnitude to the (average)
asset correlation itself which is a clear indication of an economically relevant bias. At other times,
the bias turns negative which is further evidence of the importance of acknowledging the impact of
currency ﬂuctuations on asset correlations. The time-variation patterns are different for the different
currencies, particularly for the minor ones represented by the Argentine peso (ARS) and the Chinese
renminbi (CNY). The ARS represents a currency that has plummeted against the US dollar over the
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Fig. 4. The average asset correlation bias (for the 435 correlations between the 30 DJIA-ﬁrms) across the time-period 2000–2013
for  the six currency exposures: the US dollar index (USDX), the euro (EUR), the British pound (GBP), the Japanese yen (YPY), the
Argentine peso (ARS) and the Chinese renminbi (CNY).
sample period. The credit risk of a portfolio of bonds and loans issued by ﬁrms with Argentine peso-
exposed assets (and most likely falling market capitalizations) would have had to be adjusted upwards
due to the fall in the peso exchange rate and the positive link between the bias and the ﬁrms’ asset
value–exchange rate correlations. An additional (and unrelated) observation is the hike in the bias in
2002 which is caused by the sudden devaluation of the peso in January 2002, the starting point of the
following decade-long depreciation. The CNY, in turn, demonstrates the effect of a currency-peg (or
quasi-peg) on the bias. From 2000 to 2005 the CNY was effectively pegged to the dollar and there is,
consequently, no bias. After the gradual relaxation of the peg in 2005 the bias is no longer zero. The
bias is comparatively small, though, since the CNY/USD exchange rate volatility remains very low also
after the lifting of the peg.
A ﬁnal consequence of the bias is that so-called ﬂight-to-quality behavior amongst investors can,
indirectly, make the problem with underestimation of credit risk worse, through an underestimation
of the asset correlation. During the latter third of the sample, i.e. during the ﬁnancial crisis, the asset
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value–exchange rate correlations for the ﬁrms in the DJIA index (not presented) have been signiﬁcantly
higher than before. This is the result of a strengthening of the USD together with a market-wide fall
in asset values (and stock prices) which, at least partly, is due to a rotation away from equity into
bonds together with US investors repatriating international money and foreign investors re-balancing
their portfolios from riskier to safer jurisdictions during the crisis. As an indirect consequence of this
behavior, the asset correlation bias increases (as theoretically predicted by Fig. 3 and empirically
demonstrated by Fig. 4) and so does the underestimation of the actual portfolio credit risk.
5. Conclusions
Recent ﬁndings suggest that the credit risk of corporate debt portfolios is likely to be underesti-
mated due to biased asset correlation estimates when there is a currency mismatch between the ﬁrms’
assets and liabilities. Tasche (2007) derives analytical expressions for the asset correlation bias and
Byström (2013) tests the economic signiﬁcance of the bias empirically. Here, we continue this work
by looking at the time-variation of the bias and on the dependency of the bias on currency move-
ments. Both the volatility of the exchange rate and the correlations between the asset values of the
ﬁrms and the exchange rate affect the bias, and we ﬁnd the sensitivity of the bias to the former to be
the greatest. The wide ﬂuctuations of the asset value–exchange rate correlations over time, however,
mean that these correlations, nonetheless, have a more profound economic signiﬁcance on the bias.
Empirically, the average bias for the cross-section of 30 ﬁrms (and 435 asset correlations) in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average index has been large for the lion part of the 2000–2013 period although it
ﬂuctuates widely. Also, interestingly, and contrary to the assumptions of previous studies, the bias
for the average ﬁrm-pair has actually been negative for shorter periods. The bias is, of course, more
signiﬁcant for some currencies than for others but the general policy implication is, nonetheless, that
the currency exposure of ﬁrms in ﬁnancial institutions’ credit portfolios should be acknowledged in
risk assessments, at the very least when the institution is stress-tested. Perhaps a rule of thumb in
stress tests could be to simply double any traditional asset correlation estimate that ignores exchange
rate risk. In times when currency movements are becoming increasingly important such prudence
seems more justiﬁed than ever.
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